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Restroom Use, Civil Rights, and Free Speech 
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TIMOTHY ZICK* 
Commentators have expressed concerns that litigants are invoking the 
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause strategically, in order to 
compensate for the weakness or futility of other constitutional claims. 
The phenomenon has been given a label—”opportunism”—and 
scholars have examined some of its causes and consequences. This 
Article takes a closer and somewhat skeptical look at the concept of free 
speech “opportunism.” It imagines that the Free Speech Clause will be 
invoked in challenges to laws or policies that restrict public restroom 
use based on a person’s gender. Would such challenges be 
“opportunistic,” as the term has been defined? What would such claims 
tell us about the causes and consequences of invoking the Free Speech 
Clause, particularly in situations where it appears to be a second-best 
claim? Drawing lessons from the restroom example, as well as the 
broader civil rights free speech tradition, the Article argues for greater 
precision and caution when affixing the “opportunism” label. It also 
contends that while strategic free speech claims could produce certain 
costs, they might also produce some underappreciated benefits. 
Ultimately, the Article suggests that criticisms of particular litigants or 
claims seem misdirected. The real concern appears to be the substance 
of free speech doctrines and theories. These facilitate free speech 
entrepreneurism, but may also produce an expansionist Free Speech 
Clause that subordinates and supplants other constitutional rights. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
At a First Amendment symposium I organized a few years ago, a foreboding 
darkness hung over the subject of the Free Speech Clause.1 Speaker after 
speaker rose to argue that litigants were aggressively and strategically invoking 
the Free Speech Clause, with the result that the clause was trespassing in places 
it did not belong. Scholars worried that as a result of these invocations, the Free 
Speech Clause’s boundaries and principles were being warped. They argued that 
we needed to get a grip on the Free Speech Clause before it swallowed up 
everything in its path, from professional licensing regulations, to commercial 
laws, to data privacy laws, to pharmaceutical disclosure requirements. 
The tone of the discussion was set by Professor Fred Schauer’s presentation, 
which reprised the prospect, raised in some of his earlier work, that in the 
absence of a proper “hammer” to beat back commercial and other government 
regulations, the Free Speech Clause was being used as an ill-fitting but 
sometimes effective “pipe wrench.”2 This, in essence, is how Professor Schauer 
defines “First Amendment opportunism”—invoking a “plausibly effective but 
ill-fitting” First Amendment to do a job better suited to the Equal Protection 
Clause, the Due Process Clause, or some other constitutional provision.3 
Although Professor Schauer appears to stop short of declaring that 
“opportunism” is a pejorative label, he and other scholars have argued that the 
phenomenon carries serious risks—to the central values of the Free Speech 
                                                                                                                     
 1 The symposium contributions were published in The Contemporary First 
Amendment: Freedom of Speech, Press, and Assembly Symposium, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1029 (2015). The symposium’s tone was no anomaly. Other scholars have also criticized the 
path that free speech precedents and doctrines have recently taken. See, e.g., STEVEN H. 
SHIFFRIN, WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT? (2016). 
 2 See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1614–17 (2015) [hereinafter Schauer, Politics and 
Incentives]; see also Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY 
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174, 175 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. 
Stone eds., 2002) [hereinafter Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism] (using the hammer 
and pipe wrench analogy). 
 3 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 175–76. Although Schauer 
refers generally to the “First Amendment,” his examples and analysis show that it is actually 
the Free Speech Clause—i.e., not the Press Clause, Assembly Clause, or Petition Clause—
that is being invoked in a manner that he deems “opportunistic.” Thus, I will refer in this 
Article to “free speech opportunism.”  
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Clause, to free speech doctrine and theory, and even to the prospects for 
American self-government.4 
These concerns are motivated by authentic desires to preserve coverage and 
protection for speech that is truly vital to objects at the core of the modern Free 
Speech Clause—in particular, political discourse. Still, it seemed to me then, as 
it does now, that the label “opportunism” might sweep too broadly and suggest 
a pejoratism that is unwarranted, at least in certain contexts and cases. Simply 
put, strategic, enterprising, or what we might call “entrepreneurial” invocations 
of the Free Speech Clause are not always or necessarily bad or undesirable. 
Indeed, to some degree, the modern Free Speech Clause is deeply rooted in just 
these sorts of claims. 
Most of the literature and commentary concerning free speech opportunism 
has focused on commercial litigants, who are purportedly (mis-)using the Free 
Speech Clause as a deregulatory tool.5 I want to direct attention to a different 
context. Broadly speaking, my Article focuses on the category of civil rights 
claims. It begins with a claim that has yet to arise, but seems to meet the basic 
definition of “free speech opportunism.”6 Some states have passed but repealed, 
while others are actively considering, laws or policies that would restrict public 
restroom use based on a person’s gender.7 It seems likely that at some point a 
state or locality will restrict restroom use in this manner. It is also a given that 
challengers will file suit to enjoin enforcement of any such provision. It is less 
certain whether the Free Speech Clause will be invoked in such cases.8 
Let us suppose that it will be. Would such an invocation be “opportunistic”? 
What standards or factors would assist us in making that determination? And 
what would such invocations tell us about the causes and consequences of using 
the Free Speech Clause to advance what would seem to be a constitutional 
equality claim or movement? 
                                                                                                                     
 4 See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 133 (2016); 
Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant 
Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1390 (2017). 
 5 See, e.g., Shanor, supra note 4, at 134. 
 6 See generally Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 176. 
 7 E.g., Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act (“House Bill 2”), Sess. L. No. 2016-3, 
§§ 1.2–1.3, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Extra Sess. 12, 12–13 (repealed 2017). North 
Carolina’s restriction on restroom use was later repealed. According to the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, in the 2017 legislative session sixteen states have 
considered passing gender-based restrictions on the use of public facilities. Another six states 
have considered laws that would preempt localities from enacting protections for transgender 
persons. And fourteen states have considered adopting public school policies that would limit 
the rights of transgender students. See Joellen Kralik, “Bathroom Bill” Legislative Tracking, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 28, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-
bathroom-bill-legislative-tracking635951130.aspx [https://perma.cc/7KND-ZCXV]. 
 8 To date, courts have avoided deciding constitutional claims, focusing instead on the 
application of anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. 
Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) (evaluating transgender student’s restroom access claim 
under Title IX). 
966 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:4 
Part II of the Article introduces the concept of “free speech opportunism” 
and briefly discusses its purported causes and costs. It also describes the related 
phenomenon of free speech “expansionism,” which is the concern that 
successful free speech opportunism will result in the Free Speech Clause’s 
occupation of territory that rightfully belongs to other areas of law or different 
constitutional provisions.9 
Part III turns to the restroom use free speech claim. The example, and the 
broader tradition of civil rights free speech litigation of which it would be a part, 
highlight some difficulties with the “opportunism” label. On the surface, a 
restroom use free speech claim would appear to be quintessentially 
opportunistic. The constitutional injury is discrimination in access to a public 
facility or place, based on gender or gender orientation. That sounds like an 
equal protection issue. However, relative to other available claims, the free 
speech argument is quite strong. In specific contexts, restroom use would be 
covered and perhaps even protected speech.10 Even assuming that there are 
“proper” invocations of the Free Speech Clause—i.e., those that further its 
accepted core values11—the restroom use claim seems to qualify. Moreover, if 
successful, such a claim would not produce the kind of opportunism costs critics 
have identified.12 In addition, placed in broader historical context, restroom use 
free speech claims would be part of a long and venerable tradition of 
entrepreneurial civil rights free speech litigation. Viewed from this perspective, 
a restroom use claim would invoke the Free Speech Clause synergistically, 
rather than opportunistically, in order to further both free speech and equal 
protection values. In sum, in this context, the Free Speech Clause may not be a 
perfect hammer; but it also does not seem like a clumsy pipe wrench either.  
Part IV uses the restroom use and civil rights examples to further explore 
the concept, causes, and consequences of free speech “opportunism.” We ought 
to resist what Justice Cardozo once referred to as the “tyranny of labels.”13 If 
we are going to use the label “opportunism,” particularly in a pejorative way, 
we ought to do so with precision and care. Whether a particular invocation of 
the Free Speech Clause is “opportunistic” requires a careful case-by-case 
analysis that includes a consideration of the context, comparative merit, and 
likely consequences of each claim. In terms of causes, the Article argues that 
part of what may be driving resort to the Free Speech Clause is an increasingly 
activist state that is subject to relatively few federal constitutional limits. 
Further, we ought to consider not just the potential costs, but also the possible 
benefits, of invoking the Free Speech Clause entrepreneurially. Ultimately, 
                                                                                                                     
 9 See Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1199, 1200 (2015). 
 10 On the distinction between “covered” and “protected” speech, see Frederick Schauer, 
The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional 
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004). 
 11 See generally Weiland, supra note 4. 
 12 See infra Part II. 
 13 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934). 
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critics’ focus on the strategic motives of litigants and claimants seems 
misplaced. The real concern seems to be the substance of free speech doctrines 
and theories. These create opportunities for entrepreneurial free speech activity. 
They also raise the specter of an expanding Free Speech Clause that could 
subordinate and supplant other constitutional rights. Thus, the Article concludes 
that as between free speech “opportunism” and free speech “expansionism,” we 
ought to be most concerned about the latter. 
II. OPPORTUNISM AND EXPANSIONISM 
In recent years, a general concern has arisen that litigants are invoking the 
Free Speech Clause strategically in order to win cases they would likely lose 
under other rights provisions. Some have argued that litigants are dressing up 
nonspeech rights claims in free speech garb, in order to reap the benefits of the 
Free Speech Clause’s generous coverage, protection, and influence.14 Much of 
the angst concerning this phenomenon relates to commercial litigants, who 
critics claim have used the Free Speech Clause as a substitute for the Due 
Process Clause and other constitutional provisions.15 A related concern, to 
which the label “expansionism” has been applied, is that successful 
opportunistic free speech claims will result in the Free Speech Clause colonizing 
legal and constitutional territory once occupied by other authorities.16 
Commentators have argued that these two phenomena are associated with what 
I refer to below as “opportunism costs.”  
A. Hammers and Pipe Wrenches 
In a 2002 book chapter, Professor Frederick Schauer coined the phrase 
“First Amendment opportunism.”17 Professor Schauer used a metaphor to 
explain this concept. “Suppose you need to drive a nail into a board but have no 
hammer,” he asks.18 “You do, however,” he continues, “have a pipe wrench.”19 
The metaphorical hammer is a constitutional provision that “fits” the facts and 
circumstances at hand, and hence provides a proper tool for challenging state 
action. The metaphorical pipe wrench is the First Amendment—in particular, 
the Free Speech Clause—which stands in for the hammer and does work it was 
not designed to do, but which it can accomplish if one applies adequate resolve 
and force. 
                                                                                                                     
 14 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 175–76.  
 15 Id. at 177–78. 
 16 See Kendrick, supra note 9, at 1200 (describing “expansionism” as the situation 
“where the First Amendment’s territory pushes outward to encompass ever more areas of 
law”). 
 17 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 176. 
 18 Id. at 175. 
 19 Id. 
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Professor Schauer chose to proceed by way of metaphor rather than 
definition. A basic dictionary definition of “opportunism” is “the art, policy, or 
practice of taking advantage of opportunities or circumstances often with little 
regard for principles or consequences.”20 In this case, the definition essentially 
tracks the metaphor. Schauer’s basic claim is that a wide range of litigants, faced 
with immediate problems and goals but lacking the right constitutional tool to 
succeed, have strategically invoked the “plausibly effective but ill-fitting” Free 
Speech Clause to do the job.21 In Schauer’s view, “[t]he job frequently gets done 
but, as with driving a nail with a pipe wrench, the job gets done poorly and the 
tool is damaged in the process.”22 As both the metaphor and definition suggest, 
the claim is that opportunistic litigants act with little or no regard for the Free 
Speech Clause’s appropriate uses or values.23 They are motivated primarily, if 
not solely, by the desire to pound the nail into the board. 
Professor Schauer identifies what he claims are opportunistic uses of the 
Free Speech Clause in several contexts—commercial speech, nude dancing, the 
U.S. military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, and campaign finance 
regulation.24 In each area, he claims, litigants have turned to the Free Speech 
Clause rather than the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or other 
constitutional provisions that appear to address the core or fundamental harm 
produced by the relevant legal restrictions.25 
It is worth noting that many of the nonspeech claims in Schauer’s examples 
do not appear to be very strong on the merits. For example, Due Process Clause 
doctrine dictates that commercial regulations are reviewed only for 
“rationality,” which typically results in government laws and regulations being 
upheld.26 However, Schauer argues that litigants have frequently turned to the 
Free Speech Clause even in cases where the Free Speech Clause claim is of no 
greater merit.27 As Schauer puts it, the free speech argument has been “selected 
as the winner among the array of implausible claims.”28 
B. Opportunism Causes 
Professor Schauer and others have suggested several possible causes that 
have led to an upsurge in free speech opportunism. In constitutional litigation 
                                                                                                                     
 20 Opportunism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/opportunism [https://perma.cc/WB7C-UETV] (last updated Nov. 6, 2017). 
 21 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 175. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See generally Weiland, supra note 4. 
 24 Schauer also cites free speech arguments by feminists in the antipornography 
movement as an example. See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 187 
n.52. For additional purported examples of free speech opportunism, see Schauer, Politics 
and Incentives, supra note 2, at 1614–16. 
 25 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 191. 
 26 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
 27 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 191. 
 28 Id. at 186. 
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and public discourse, the Free Speech Clause has what Schauer has referred to 
as a “magnetic” appeal.29 Thus, a litigant seeking the “political and rhetorical 
high ground” is generally well-served by a Free Speech Clause that commands 
both.30 In U.S. courts, Schauer observes, freedom of speech is often an 
“argumentative showstopper[].”31  
Text and doctrine contribute to this show-stopping quality. Because so 
many activities involve communication or “speech” in some respect or degree, 
free speech claims often have a surface plausibility that other constitutional 
claims do not.32 As Professor Leslie Kendrick has observed, relatively speaking, 
free speech doctrine “provides an unusually robust amount of protection for 
activities that fall within its ambit.”33  
As a result of these general factors, litigants are increasingly turning to the 
Free Speech Clause, ill-fitting tool that it is claimed to be,34 for the simple reason 
that it increases the likelihood their claims will succeed. This, Professor Schauer 
concedes, is the primary goal in all types of litigation.35 So long as free speech 
doctrine continues to develop in ways that expand or at least do not restrict 
coverage, litigants are likely to continue to look in the direction of the Free 
Speech Clause.36 
Professor Schauer identifies a half dozen more specific factors that also may 
have contributed to the rise of free speech opportunism. First, owing to its 
magnetic quality, judges, politicians, and public figures may be particularly 
reluctant to be seen as “against” free speech.37 Second, free speech arguments 
might attract “powerful but otherwise ideologically distant allies,” which might 
suggest that the arguments have broad appeal and are based on neutral 
principles.38 Third, invocation of the Free Speech Clause might be treated as a 
patriotic act.39 Thus, the litigant who invokes the Free Speech Clause might be 
“like the politician who clothes himself in the American flag.”40 Fourth, First 
Amendment arguments in general might benefit from the fact that the 
institutional press, one of their main beneficiaries, has “enormous influence on 
                                                                                                                     
 29 Schauer, supra note 10, at 1787–800. 
 30 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 176. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See id.  
 33 Kendrick, supra note 9, at 1209. 
 34 Schauer, Politics and Incentives, supra note 2, at 1614–16. 
 35 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 191; see also Schauer, 
Politics and Incentives, supra note 2, at 1625 (“[M]ost lawyers who raise constitutional 
claims or defenses do so not out of their own commitment to certain constitutional principles, 
but rather because they believe that the constitutional argument will increase their likelihood 
of winning.”).  
 36 See Schauer, Politics and Incentives, supra note 2, at 1633 (suggesting that recent 
Supreme Court precedents point in this direction). 
 37 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 192. 
 38 Id. at 193. 
 39 Id. at 192–93. 
 40 Id. at 193. 
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public opinion.”41 Fifth, it could be the case that the “cultural penetration” of 
organizations, including the ACLU, has led political elites to embrace the Free 
Speech Clause.42 Finally, the Free Speech Clause may have benefitted from the 
fact that some of the first to invoke it in the courts—the Jehovah’s Witnesses—
were generally perceived as posing no serious threat to the established political 
or social order.43  
In sum, the cause of free speech opportunism has been traced in part to the 
unremarkable desire of constitutional litigants to win their cases. However, 
Professor Schauer and other commentators have also suggested a variety of 
other social, cultural, and doctrinal causes.  
C. Opportunism Costs 
Commentators have identified a number of what might be called 
“opportunism costs” that are associated with free speech opportunism. These 
include the possibility that the Free Speech Clause will supplant or subordinate 
other constitutional provisions and areas of law. As well, some have expressed 
concerns regarding the effects opportunism may have on the Free Speech Clause 
itself. 
Adopting and expanding on the opportunism critique, Professor Leslie 
Kendrick has identified a phenomenon she claims is related to potential misuses 
of the Free Speech Clause—“First Amendment expansionism.”44 Simply put, 
expansionism is a product or effect of successful free speech opportunism. It 
involves colonization by the Free Speech Clause of entire areas of law as well 
as other constitutional provisions. 
As Professor Kendrick explains, when opportunistic speech claims succeed, 
the “First Amendment’s territory pushes outward to encompass ever more areas 
of law.”45 Judging by recent commentary, including Kendrick’s, a primary 
concern seems to be that as commercial litigants have success invoking the Free 
Speech Clause, it will occupy more and more of the regulatory landscape. Thus, 
deregulatory claims that once were brought under the Due Process Clause, the 
Takings Clause, and other constitutional provisions relating to economic liberty 
will be recast in the image of the Free Speech Clause.46  
The possibility that the Free Speech Clause will be the vehicle of economic 
deregulation is not the only concern. Entire areas of law, from sexual liberty to 
campaign finance, could come to be governed by the Free Speech Clause. For 
example, as Professor Schauer has suggested, principles of sexual privacy and 
                                                                                                                     
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 193. 
 44 See generally Kendrick, supra note 9. 
 45 Id. at 1200. 
 46 See id. at 1207–08 (discussing Due Process Clause and economic liberty); Schauer, 
First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 177–80 (discussing commercial speech 
coverage).  
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electoral accountability could be translated into Free Speech Clause concerns.47 
This could result in significant changes in terms of how we debate and regulate 
a variety of social activities.48  
Just as areas of law like commercial regulation are subject to free speech 
colonization, so too is constitutional territory at some risk. As noted, in the 
economic realm, commentators have expressed concerns that the Free Speech 
Clause is being invoked as a substitute for the Due Process Clause.49 In the most 
extreme case, the Free Speech Clause could expand its territorial reach in a way 
that supplants most or perhaps all other constitutional rights provisions. This 
could ultimately produce a nontextual, generalized “Free Expression Clause” 
that governs vast areas of economic and social activity.  
In addition to the prospect of expansionism, commentators have identified 
a number of other potential opportunism costs. According to Professor Schauer, 
one potential opportunism cost might be the significant distortion of the Free 
Speech Clause.50 As he concedes, this presupposes that the Free Speech Clause 
is not simply the accretion of precedents over time—i.e., the product of 
numerous common law adjudications—but rather is properly understood to 
serve particular values or purposes.51 If, for example, the primary purpose of the 
Free Speech Clause is to facilitate political discourse and collective self-
governance, then opportunistic misapplications—in the area of commercial 
regulation, or sexual liberty, or what have you—may result in a degree of 
distortion of the clause’s core purposes.52 In that event, the Free Speech Clause 
may “lose its ability to perform the function for which it was originally 
designed.”53  
Professor Schauer also identifies another general cost, namely that 
Americans will “find ourselves with a cultural understanding of the First 
Amendment that diverges substantially from what a less misused First 
Amendment would have produced.”54 At the same time, he allows that it is 
possible that the Free Speech Clause is “merely the raw material of opportunism 
and nothing else,” in which case free speech opportunism “can no longer be 
perceived as a problem, but will have told us something revealing about just 
what the First Amendment is.”55 Again, recognizing this as an opportunism cost 
depends significantly on whether there is in fact a “legally undistorted idea” of 
                                                                                                                     
 47 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 183, 190. 
 48 See id. at 183 (arguing that free speech opportunism may have the unintended 
consequence of “moving the First Amendment in such a way that it is taken as the appropriate 
repository, both in court and in broader public discourse, for the full range of arguments and 
beliefs about all forms of sexual liberty”). 
 49 See, e.g., id. at 177–78. 
 50 Id. at 195. 
 51 Id. at 195–96. 
 52 Id. at 194–95. 
 53 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 195. 
 54 Id. at 176 (footnote omitted). 
 55 Id. at 195–96. 
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the Free Speech Clause—something Professor Schauer admits has not yet been 
established.56 
Professor Schauer provides some examples of more specific doctrinal 
distortions that may occur as a result of free speech opportunism. For example, 
he suggests that the nondeference typically applied to government regulators in 
free speech cases might be watered down or even reversed in certain cases or 
areas.57 Relatedly, Professor Schauer suggests that the tradition of independent 
appellate review in free speech cases could be weakened as a result of free 
speech opportunism.58 It is also possible, he argues, that the strictures of existing 
categories of “uncovered” speech, including incitement to unlawful activity, 
will be watered down as they are applied to noncore speech.59 At the same time, 
however, Professor Schauer allows that not all of these changes are necessarily 
or inevitably undesirable.60  
Other scholars have been less ambivalent. One commentator has argued that 
free speech opportunism could lead to the demolition of the administrative state 
and the demise of self-government.61 Another has argued that traditional 
libertarian free speech theories may not survive the phenomenon of free speech 
opportunism.62 A primary concern of opportunism’s critics is that the 
phenomenon will lead to massive deregulation in a number of areas, including 
business and data privacy.63 In sum, commentators are concerned that if free 
speech claims are successful in these and other areas, government will be unable 
to pursue important public health, safety, and privacy interests.64 
Despite these potentially serious costs, it is somewhat surprising how 
ambivalent some commentators seemingly remain about free speech 
opportunism. Again, at one point Professor Schauer chalks free speech 
opportunism up to good lawyering—“lawyering in general is opportunistic,” he 
writes, “and necessarily and properly so.”65 More generally, Schauer observes 
that the term “opportunistic” is one that “hovers precariously between the 
pejorative and the complimentary.”66 Perhaps most tellingly, he hesitates to 
refer to any particular invocation of the Free Speech Clause as a “misuse” of the 
provision. Again, the reason for this reluctance is that such judgments would 
presuppose what has yet to be established—i.e., agreement regarding what 
constitutes a “proper” use of the Free Speech Clause.67  
                                                                                                                     
 56 Id. at 196. 
 57 Schauer, Politics and Incentives, supra note 2, at 1635. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1636. 
 61 See Shanor, supra note 4, at 206. 
 62 See Weiland, supra note 4, at 1389.  
 63 See Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1501, 1507–08 (2015). See generally Kendrick, supra note 9. 
 64 Shanor, supra note 4, at 205; Weiland, supra note 4, at 1469–71. 
 65 Schauer, Politics and Incentives, supra note 2, at 1625. 
 66 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2, at 176. 
 67 Id. at 176–77 n.4. 
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III. RESTROOM USE AND OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS FREE SPEECH CLAIMS 
Having discussed the basic concept, the purported causes, and the possible 
costs of free speech opportunism, I turn to what I hope will be an illuminating 
example: free speech challenges to gender-based restrictions on public restroom 
use. On the surface, this seems like the sort of “opportunistic” free speech claim 
some scholars might be concerned about. However, the claim highlights some 
of the potential problems with the opportunism label.  
A. Would the Restroom Use Free Speech Claim Be “Opportunistic”? 
In March 2016, North Carolina enacted the Public Facilities Privacy and 
Security Act—officially known as “An Act to Provide for Single-Sex Multiple 
Occupancy Bathroom and Changing Facilities in Schools and Public Agencies 
and to Create Statewide Consistency in Regulation of Employment and Public 
Accommodations.”68 The law, which was enacted in response to a Charlotte 
ordinance that extended anti-discrimination protections to gay, lesbian, and 
transgender persons,69 eliminated these protections and prohibited localities 
from enacting them in the future.70 In addition, the North Carolina law provided 
that in government buildings, individuals could only use the restroom or 
changing facility that corresponded to the sex on their birth certificate.71 Under 
the law, transgender persons who did not or were not able to change the gender 
identity on their birth certificate would have been barred from using the 
restroom that corresponded to their gender identity.72 
A group of plaintiffs challenged the North Carolina law, including the 
restroom access provisions, in federal court. They alleged that the law violated 
Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination, the Equal Protection Clause, and 
the Due Process Clause.73 Recently, owing in part to actual and threatened 
boycotts of the state by sports organizations and consumers across the country, 
the North Carolina law was partially repealed.74 The restroom provision was 
part of this repeal.75 Nevertheless, as noted earlier, many states are considering 
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adopting laws similar to North Carolina’s.76 And many public school districts 
are considering adopting policies that would impact transgender students’ 
restroom use in similar ways.77 
The legal challenge to North Carolina’s law did not include a Free Speech 
Clause count.78 For purposes of the analysis that follows, I want to assume that 
some future litigant will invoke the Free Speech Clause, perhaps among other 
constitutional rights provisions. What reasons might litigants have to pursue a 
Free Speech Clause claim in this context? Assuming that there are indeed 
“appropriate” invocations of the Free Speech Clause, is this free speech claim 
properly characterized as a misuse of the clause? What consequences would 
follow in the event the Free Speech Clause claim was successful?  
Recall that “opportunistic” claims are ones that repackage equal protection, 
due process, and other constitutional claims as free speech claims, primarily in 
order to convince courts to grant constitutional relief.79 On the surface, the 
hypothetical restroom claim seems like a textbook example. The fundamental 
harm is discrimination in the use of restroom facilities, which is covered—
constitutionally—by either the Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause. 
Thus, this seems to be a nonspeech constitutional claim masquerading as a free 
speech claim. The free speech argument is a “second-best fallback position,”80 
a “pipe wrench” doing a job best left to a “hammer.” Invoking the Free Speech 
Clause in this context would appear to be a strategic ploy to increase the chances 
of winning the case, rather than an effort to facilitate or advance Free Speech 
Clause interests or values. 
This is a perfectly understandable way to view such a claim. After all, one 
uses the restroom to relieve oneself, not to communicate anything. If there is 
any constitutional harm in restricting restroom use, it would not seem to fall 
under the coverage or protection of the Free Speech Clause. The plaintiff just 
wants to win her case, and the “pipe wrench” Free Speech Clause might get the 
job done.  
However, this type of claim raises questions about what factors or criteria 
distinguish “opportunistic” from more appropriate Free Speech Clause claims. 
Surely it is not sufficient simply to note the facial oddity of connecting restroom 
use and freedom of speech. After all, at least in the abstract, burning a flag does 
not seem particularly expressive. But free speech claims are not developed and 
advanced in a vacuum. They arise in factual, jurisprudential, historical, and 
political settings that presumably inform the question whether a particular claim 
constitutes an opportunistic misuse or misappropriation of the Free Speech 
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Clause. Although we cannot know the motives of litigants, these contextual 
considerations can help us determine whether a particular claim is 
“opportunistic.”  
According to opportunism critics, in many cases litigants are unnecessarily 
resorting to the Free Speech Clause. The supposition is that they are choosing 
the Free Speech Clause over equally viable, or equally nonviable, constitutional 
claims.81 In fact, however, litigants frequently do not choose between claims at 
all but instead pursue them cumulatively or in the aggregate.82 Faced with a 
relatively small menu of constitutional choices, litigants frequently pursue 
multiple rights claims in the hope that one will ultimately prevail.83 
In any event, opportunism critics argue that even though it provides no 
greater degree of assurance that plaintiffs will prevail, the free speech argument 
is often chosen to do all of the work.84 So one of the things we would 
presumably want to know in assessing whether a free speech claim is 
opportunistic is whether plaintiffs had other equally viable alternative claims. 
This requires that we somehow measure the relative strength of the claims. 
Granted, this can be a difficult endeavor. However, to state that litigants are 
relying on the Free Speech Clause when doctrines are effectively “equal,” and 
in many cases equally bad, is to make an empirical claim. Finally, although we 
cannot discover the motives and purposes of litigants who file free speech 
claims, we can assess whether their claims would advance principles and values 
related to the Free Speech Clause as these are presently understood. 
Opportunistic invocations are, by definition, unconcerned with such values and 
principles.85  
What do these factors or criteria tell us about the hypothetical restroom use 
example? The equal protection and due process claims are not particularly 
strong. Unless lower courts are inclined to get ahead of the Supreme Court and 
adopt the view that transgender status is “suspect,” or that discrimination against 
transgender persons is a form of gender discrimination (approaches available to, 
but not taken by, the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court’s 
marriage equality decision),86 litigants are likely to have a very difficult time 
prevailing on equal protection grounds. Thus, while restricting public restroom 
facility use based on birth gender certainly sounds like an equal protection harm, 
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 82 See Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. 
L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2017) (discussing “cumulative,” “hybrid,” and “intersectional” rights 
claims). See generally Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1067 (2016) (examining Supreme Court decisions that combine rights to dispose of 
cases). 
 83 Abrams & Garrett, supra note 82, at 1310. 
 84 See generally Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 2. 
 85 See id. at 176. 
 86 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–04 (2015) (invoking the Equal 
Protection Clause along with the Due Process Clause to support recognition of a right to 
marriage equality). 
976 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:4 
equal protection doctrine and precedents may not presently recognize this 
particular harm or may not provide a sound basis for challenging the restroom 
limitation. Further, the government’s purported interests in public safety and 
privacy may well provide a rational basis for discriminating based on birth 
gender in this particular context.  
As for the Due Process Clause, Obergefell’s opening lines observe that the 
Constitution protects “a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow 
persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”87 This 
conception of “liberty” is grounded in the Due Process Clause, but it rests on a 
connection between self-identification and expression. Thus, Obergefell does 
not recognize a fundamental right to self-identify as male or female;88 however, 
it may strengthen a free speech claim relating to gender identification. 
Moreover, although the Due Process Clause protects a sphere of sexual liberty, 
the precedents in that area speak to intimate decision-making in areas such as 
private sexual activity and reproductive choice.89 Although it is related to 
intimate biological functions, public restroom use seems quite far afield of 
current privacy jurisprudence. Under current doctrine, courts are not likely to 
recognize a fundamental right to use the public restroom of one’s choice. 
By contrast, under existing free speech doctrine the Free Speech Clause 
claim seems relatively strong. In order to be covered under the Free Speech 
Clause, the communication or act must constitute “speech.”90 The “coverage” 
question asks simply whether an act such as choosing and using a public 
restroom is “speech” within the domain of the Free Speech Clause.91 When a 
person relies not on the spoken or written word, but on symbolic acts, to convey 
her message or idea the Supreme Court has nominally required that (1) the actor 
intend to communicate some message and (2) an audience is likely to understand 
the message.92  
The Supreme Court has itself not always been consistent in terms of 
applying this standard. Indeed, sometimes the Court does not explicitly apply 
the standard at all. In several cases, it has simply assumed coverage. Thus, 
burning a draft card as part of a political protest, burning the flag in a similar 
context, and sleeping outdoors as part of a protest of laws affecting the homeless 
have all been at least assumed to be “speech” properly within the coverage of 
the Free Speech Clause.93 Although the Court has warned that it cannot accept 
the proposition that an infinite variety of conduct will be considered “speech” 
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within the meaning of the Free Speech Clause,94 under the governing standard 
so long as an act has some communicative aspect or characteristic, then courts 
are quite likely to answer the coverage question in the affirmative.95 In other 
words, the coverage bar is rather low. 
Under this doctrine, the claim that gender-based restrictions on restroom use 
at least implicate the Free Speech Clause hardly seems fanciful. The question is 
not whether a person’s use of the restroom—or draft card burning, or flag 
burning, or sleeping, or stripping—communicates something in the abstract. 
Rather, the question is whether, in a particular context, choice or use of 
restroom intentionally communicates something that an audience is likely to 
understand.96 Under this loose, contextualized standard, some transgender 
plaintiffs can satisfy the Free Speech Clause’s coverage requirements.  
To make the analysis more tangible, consider the case of a public high 
school student who is a transgender female—i.e., a biological male who 
identifies as and desires to live in all respects as female.97 Her public school has 
a policy that requires either that the student use the boys’ restroom or use a 
separate unisex restroom. Is the use of the girls’ restroom covered speech under 
the Free Speech Clause?98 Consider also a facility that is open to the public, and 
subject to a similar law. Under Spence, does the student or member of the public 
intend to convey any message when she uses the girls’ restroom, and is an 
audience likely to understand what is being conveyed? Or, stated differently, 
can we at least assume that in this particular context use of the girls’ restroom 
has some communicative aspect or characteristic?99 
Some commentators have analyzed the free speech implications of acts 
relating to gender identity.100 Jeffrey Kosbie has addressed the communicative 
nature of gendered dress and gendered conduct—including restroom use. He 
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concludes that dress, appearance, and restroom use can all be considered speech 
under current free speech doctrine.101 Kosbie’s principal claim is that these 
actions communicate the social meaning of gender.102 Audiences that witness 
gendered acts, such as how a person dresses or which restroom she uses, 
typically understand that a conception of gender is being conveyed—even if 
they do not necessarily attach a specific message to particular actions.103 
As Kosbie observes, communication of and respecting gender is deeply 
embedded in our social norms concerning masculinity and femininity.104 When 
the state mandates that a transgender girl dress as a boy, disciplines a male 
officer for wearing earrings while off duty, awards child custody to a mother 
based on concerns about how a child would understand a father’s gender 
transition, or prohibits a transgender female from using the girls’ restroom, it 
suppresses gender nonconformity.105 In each context, the state is essentially 
defining what it means to be “masculine” or “feminine.” And it is doing so by 
means of rules and restrictions that suppress communicative actions that defy or 
dissent from officially prescribed definitions of male and female.106 
With regard specifically to restroom use, Kosbie observes that “[e]veryone 
communicates a message of gender identity by using a single-sex restroom.”107 
Whether consciously or not, audiences use social norms to ascribe gender 
meaning to restroom choice just as they do the choice whether to wear a dress 
or a tuxedo. As Kosbie notes: “Restroom choice is deliberate and intended to 
communicate a central aspect of identity: ‘I am a woman,’ or ‘I am a man.’”108 
Current free speech standards do not require courts to accept all of these 
general observations, much less the gender construction theories that underlie 
them, in order to conclude that restroom use is communicative. What is 
necessary is that in a specific case—as, for example, with respect to my 
hypothetical high school student or member of the public—the use by a 
transgender person of a particular restroom has a communicative element. For 
both the student and the member of the public, restroom use may well be “a 
powerful act of self-definition.”109 When they use a girls’ restroom, these 
individuals intend to communicate gender or femininity. In the context of a 
controversial school policy that restricts restroom use based on birth gender, the 
audience of students and administrators is quite likely to understand this 
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message. Moreover, if there are negative reactions to the student’s use of the 
girls’ restroom, which many transgender persons report,110 these too may 
demonstrate that at least some audience members readily understand—indeed, 
strongly reject—the student’s statement of gender nonconformity.111 A similar 
context and controversy might also render use of particular public facilities 
expressive—the user intends to convey a message about gender, and the public 
may understand that this is the case.  
All of this goes to the coverage question. It does not establish that choice 
and use of a particular restroom is necessarily a form of protected speech, either 
in the context of the high school example or in the more general context of use 
of public facilities. In the schools context, restroom use restrictions that target 
the message of gender identity are presumed invalid.112 Expressive restroom use 
that interferes with the learning environment could be regulated, but only where 
there is evidence that the choice of restroom is causing material and substantial 
disruption.113 Outside the schools, a court would first determine whether the 
restroom restriction was in any way related to the communication of a message 
of gender identity. If so, then a rigorous “strict scrutiny” standard will apply.114 
If not, then an “intermediate scrutiny” standard would be applied to the restroom 
use restriction.115 The government’s interests in ensuring safety or protecting 
privacy might be adequate to justify some gendered restrictions on restroom use, 
but in a particular case a court might also find no evidence to support such 
interests. 
In any event, the coverage argument seems to be stronger in these free 
speech contexts than in the context of equal protection or due process claims. In 
the event free speech coverage is found to exist, judicial review would be more 
rigorous than the “rational basis” standard likely to apply under either the Equal 
Protection Clause or Due Process Clause. 
What about opportunism costs? As discussed earlier, some worry that 
successful invocations of the Free Speech Clause will distort its doctrines or 
expand its territory in a manner that displaces other legal concepts or 
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constitutional provisions.116 Neither of these concerns is raised by my 
hypothetical claims. 
As noted, interpreting restroom use to be, or even just assuming it is, 
expressive would result from application of longstanding free speech 
precedents.117 One may certainly take issue with those precedents, as many 
critics have.118 However, in the restroom example, invocation of the Free 
Speech Clause would follow, not distort, applicable free speech doctrine relating 
to symbolic conduct and content regulation. Nor, in the event such claims were 
to be successful, is there any danger that the Free Speech Clause would displace 
the Equal Protection Clause or any other nonspeech provision. As I discuss 
below, in this context the Free Speech Clause might serve the traditional 
function of facilitating those nonspeech constitutional claims. In that event, the 
free speech claims would represent a synergistic, not opportunistic, use of the 
Free Speech Clause. 
Would the free speech claims be opportunistic in the sense that they would 
not be concerned with, much less serve, any free speech values? No. In fact, the 
hypothetical restroom use claims implicate, and if successful would serve, all 
of the principal Free Speech Clause values or justifications that courts and 
scholars have identified.119 Individual autonomy and self-fulfillment values 
support gender exploration and the communication of gender identity. 
Marketplace or truth-seeking values are also implicated by gender 
nonconformance, which tests principles of gender construction and allows 
individuals to contest the “truth” of official orthodoxy regarding gender. 
Perhaps most importantly, given the weight many free speech theorists give to 
political speech and collective self-government,120 resistance to gender 
orthodoxy can be viewed as a form of political dissent. Insofar as laws and 
policies relating to dress, child custody, and restroom use rely upon gender to 
distribute public benefits and burdens, they touch upon matters of public 
concern that are relevant to how gender is to be taken into account by democratic 
institutions. 
It might be tempting to snigger at the notion that restroom use is a political 
concern. However, as one commentator has observed: “From the Industrial 
Revolution to Jim Crow to women’s lib to today, restrooms have been a proxy 
for political fights on almost every major issue in American life—race, class, 
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gender, crime, sexuality, you name it.”121 Thus, “[f]or more than 100 years, 
Americans have projected their most profound fears about social change onto 
public restrooms.”122 Southern officials segregated public restrooms by race, 
police raided public restrooms looking for gay male predators lurking in the 
shadows, and Phyllis Schlafly warned that equal rights for women meant loss 
of the private sanctuary of the ladies’ restroom.123 Restrooms, then, are potent 
symbols of gender, race, sexual orientation, and other forms of political 
oppression. 
Based on the opportunism criteria discussed above, a free speech challenge 
to a public restroom policy restricting access based on birth gender ought not to 
be considered a misapplication or misuse of the Free Speech Clause. Judged 
relative to other rights claims and according to free speech values, such a claim 
would be stronger and would advance First Amendment values. 
B. Free Speech Litigation and Civil Rights 
Broader contextual concerns may also inform whether a particular free 
speech claim is opportunistic. Restroom use free speech claims would actually 
belong to a long tradition of civil rights free speech litigation. 
Most of the commentary regarding free speech “opportunism” and 
“expansionism” focuses on commercial litigants’ recent resort to the Free 
Speech Clause.124 However, entrepreneurial invocations of the Free Speech 
Clause long predated this phenomenon. Throughout American history, civil 
rights activists have frequently invoked the Free Speech Clause in 
entrepreneurial and enterprising ways. They have leveraged the recognition and 
exercise of free speech rights to facilitate constitutional movements relating to 
racial equality, religious liberty, and LGBT rights.125 
In its early phases, the NAACP’s constitutional assault on racial apartheid 
relied heavily on the Free Speech Clause.126 The NAACP invoked the Free 
Speech Clause to challenge application of trespass laws in the context of lunch 
counter sit-ins, public disorder laws as applied to a silent protest in a public 
library reading room, restrictions on soliciting clients for the purpose of 
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litigating civil rights cases, application of state civil libel laws, and demands for 
the organization’s rank-and-file membership lists.127 
Much like the restroom use example, many of these early challenges appear 
on the surface to meet the definition of free speech “opportunism.”128 The 
central harm produced by laws segregating persons by race or singling them out 
for exclusion based on race was not the denial of freedom of speech, but the 
denial of equal protection of the laws and basic dignity rights. These are, 
respectively, Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause concerns. As 
well, the Assembly Clause and the Press Clause would seem more germane to 
protecting the rights of persons to gather with one another and to publish 
information. However, doctrines under those nonspeech provisions had not yet 
fully ripened. Thus, the Free Speech Clause was often invoked in their stead.129 
In other words, civil rights litigants “repackaged” what were then rather 
dubious or weak Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause claims in 
equally dubious—or, at the time, perhaps even more questionable—Free Speech 
Clause wrappers. The free speech claims offered some relief from racial 
segregation and other aspects of de jure discrimination. The Free Speech Clause 
was also used to create new organizational expressive rights and to expand 
freedom of the press. In sum, in a world in which no effective “hammers” were 
readily available, civil rights litigants frequently reached for the Free Speech 
Clause “pipe wrench” to seek relief from racial apartheid. 
I am not aware of any commentary that characterizes these claims as 
“opportunistic,” suggests that they were inappropriately strategic or cynical 
invocations of the free speech guarantee, or criticizes them as “misuses” of the 
Free Speech Clause. To the contrary, commentators have praised the NAACP’s 
free speech strategy as a brilliant, if not wholly successful, means of advancing 
the twin causes of freedom of expression and—ultimately—racial equality.130 
It would be wrong to treat the Free Speech Clause as an imposter during the 
civil rights era. After all, the NAACP was seeking to advance the political free 
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speech rights of its members, and of equality advocates more generally.131 At 
the same time, it was using the Free Speech Clause to advance its equal 
protection aims.132  
During this era, the Free Speech Clause did not colonize or supplant the 
Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause. Rather, it facilitated their 
elucidation and eventual enforcement. In doctrinal terms, discrimination based 
on expressive content would eventually come to be policed under the Free 
Speech Clause, while discrimination based on race and other suspect 
characteristics would become the domain of the Equal Protection Clause. The 
situation is a bit more complicated regarding the Assembly Clause and the Press 
Clause, both of which were cited by the Supreme Court in iconic decisions that 
also raised Free Speech Clause claims.133 As discussed below, over time the 
Free Speech Clause has come to supplant these provisions. But that was not the 
fault of civil rights litigators, who invoked the Free Speech Clause along with 
neighboring press and assembly rights. 
Civil rights free speech entrepreneurism leveraged the synergies between 
the Free Speech Clause and other constitutional rights, such as equal protection 
and due process. LGBT activists picked up where race equality predecessors left 
off. Owing in part to the thin protections offered to LGBT persons under the 
Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause, they too frequently invoked 
the Free Speech Clause—even where it did not offer a clear basis for relief. This 
was particularly the case during the early phases of the LGBT equality 
movement, when litigants energetically pursued First Amendment claims.134 
Since equal protection and due process hammers were not available, litigants 
focused instead on establishing rights to openly identify as gay or lesbian, to 
publish information about sexual orientation, to assemble for expressive 
purposes, and to come out to employers.135 Not all of these efforts were 
successful.136 And as discussed below, some of them have been criticized as 
“opportunistic.”137 However, invocation and enforcement of the Free Speech 
Clause performed a critical function in terms of advancing both the First 
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights of LGBT persons. 
In addition to the doctrinal considerations discussed earlier, this sort of 
broad context is relevant to an assessment of whether a particular free speech 
                                                                                                                     
 131 The Struggle for Civil Rights and the First Amendment, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST 
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 132 See Garner, 368 U.S. at 162–63. 
 133 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389–90 (1967) (citing both the Free Speech 
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 134 See generally BALL, supra note 125. 
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claim is “opportunistic.” In isolation, a claim that public restroom access bears 
on the freedom of speech might seem dubious. However, the claim resembles 
many of the public facilities claims brought by race and LGBT equality 
activists.138 It belongs to a long tradition of civil rights free speech advocacy in 
which civil rights proponents sought first to establish expressive identity and 
other political rights, which they later leveraged into equality and other rights. 
IV. “OPPORTUNISM” AND “EXPANSIONISM” REVISITED 
My hope is that the restroom use example, and the civil rights free speech 
tradition of which it would be a part, will help us better understand the concept, 
causes, and consequences of what critics have labeled free speech 
“opportunism.”139 If we are going to use this label, which I believe is pejorative, 
we ought to proceed with caution. In terms of what might be causing the uptick 
in Free Speech Clause invocations, we need to consider two additional factors: 
the role of the increasingly activist state and the relative paucity of constitutional 
provisions that limit its powers. Finally, as to consequences, it is worth 
considering whether there might be benefits, for both freedom of speech and 
nonspeech rights, associated with what I prefer to call “entrepreneurial” free 
speech claims. At the end of the day, we need to identify with precision the 
actual target or targets of criticism. Although the “opportunism” label suggests 
a critique of litigants or litigation tactics, it seems to be aimed more squarely at 
the substance of Free Speech Clause doctrines and the opportunities for 
expansionism that these doctrines create.140 
A. The “Tyranny of Labels” 
In the context of interpreting and applying constitutional principles, Justice 
Cardozo once warned against the “tyranny of labels.”141 He cautioned that resort 
to labels has been a “fertile source of perversion in constitutional theory.”142 
Although free speech “opportunism” is not a constitutional theory or 
principle, Cardozo’s caution applies. Critics have developed a descriptive and 
normative critique of the manner in which a particular constitutional 
provision—the Free Speech Clause—has been invoked and utilized across a 
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range of different subject areas.143 Unless we are precise about the factors that 
give rise to its application, the “opportunism” label cannot tell us which claims 
are to be treated as illegitimate or problematic. If there are indeed free speech 
claims that deserve to be called “opportunistic,” and if such claims portend the 
negative consequences some have ascribed to them, it is important that we be 
able to identify and single them out. 
There is a fundamental problem at the core of the opportunism concept. To 
allege a misuse or misapplication of the Free Speech Clause presupposes the 
existence of some agreed-upon category of proper uses or applications of the 
clause. However, critics of free speech “opportunism” readily concede that there 
is no current agreement regarding what suffices as a “proper” invocation of the 
Free Speech Clause.144 The absence of such agreed-upon criteria provides an 
independent reason to be skeptical of the “opportunism” label. Absent such 
criteria, it may be unfair, if not unjustifiable, to accuse litigants and advocates 
of exercising bad stewardship over the Free Speech Clause. 
Let us assume that traditional core values or justifications—in particular the 
concerns regarding self-government and protection of political speech—provide 
the relevant baseline. Let us also assume that litigants who fail to pursue these 
objectives are acting opportunistically and thus inappropriately. This means that 
the “opportunism” label is pejorative—a determination that the dictionary 
definition and most of the commentary on the subject seem to support.145 
As in other areas of law, there is no shortage of facially silly-sounding 
arguments in constitutional law. As I have suggested, however, what might look 
like a silly or frivolous claim on its face can become much less obviously so 
when considered in its full context. The restroom example, and similar civil 
rights free speech claims, highlight this lesson. Absent any context, claims that 
using a public restroom facility, sitting at a lunch counter, or standing in a public 
library reading room violate the Free Speech Clause seem instrumental and 
strategic. However, in the context of social and constitutional movements that 
have relied on diverse forms of communication to contend for equal rights, some 
or all of those claims appear to be far more principled. Indeed, most if not all of 
them support or facilitate traditional Free Speech Clause principles and 
justifications like those just mentioned. Even those that are primarily designed 
to accomplish nonspeech goals—i.e., to facilitate recognition of equal 
protection rights—are well within what we might consider the “normal” usages 
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of the Free Speech Clause. The claims advance free speech values including 
self-government, the search for truth, and self-actualization. 
When judging whether claims are “opportunistic,” we ought to consider the 
question as holistically and neutrally as possible. Motivations for raising free 
speech claims are often mixed, and litigants are not driven solely by the desire 
to win specific cases (although that is certainly one short-term goal).146 As the 
civil rights and LGBT examples show, free speech claims may be part of a long-
term strategy that combines free speech and nonspeech rights.147 
Moreover, the “opportunism” label ought not to be applied categorically, to 
an entire class of claims. For instance, not all “commercial” litigants are 
motivated solely or predominantly by deregulatory and economic concerns. 
Indeed, the case that first brought “commercial speech” under the coverage of 
the Free Speech Clause concerned advertisements for abortion services.148 The 
speech in that case both involved a commercial service and facilitated the 
exercise of a newly recognized constitutional right.149 Thus, even the narrative 
regarding commercial speech “opportunism” might be more complicated once 
one digs beneath the surface. 
It is also important to carefully—and realistically—assess the possible 
alternatives that are available to claimants. Use of the label “opportunism” 
implies that plaintiffs often have better options in terms of framing and 
executing lawsuits but still gravitate toward the Free Speech Clause for strategic 
reasons.150 In many cases, the assumption that plaintiffs have many viable—or 
even equally unviable—options in terms of rights claims seems highly 
questionable. In some of the examples considered above, arguments based on 
nonspeech constitutional rights were either weak or all but foreclosed under 
existing doctrines.151 Thus, it may not be the case that plaintiffs prefer to rely 
on the Free Speech Clause, rather than other provisions, owing to its cultural 
salience, so much as it is a reality that most if not all other avenues are either far 
less viable or simply unavailable. In any event, where more than one rights 
provision is potentially in play and the Free Speech Clause is among the 
possibilities, we need to engage in a fair and careful comparison of all plausible 
claims. 
Some critics of “opportunism” do take these sorts of considerations into 
account. However, sometimes they minimize the strength of the Free Speech 
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Clause argument in ways that suggest a false equivalency with alternative 
nonspeech claims. 
As discussed, one of Professor Schauer’s central claims is that litigants are 
turning to the Free Speech Clause even though the free speech arguments are 
just as dubious as arguments they could make under other provisions.152 For 
example, Professor Schauer argues that Free Speech Clause challenges to the 
U.S. military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell regulations were classic examples of free 
speech “opportunism.”153 He contends that the essential harm of Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell (DADT) was not its inhibition of speech, but its denial of equality 
and due process rights.154 
Schauer concedes that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on equal 
protection and due process grounds, owing primarily to the fact that the Supreme 
Court had not recognized LGBT rights under either provision.155 But he 
nevertheless maintains that the DADT free speech claims were “doctrinally 
dubious,” in part because the Supreme Court had held that government was 
permitted to use a person’s speech as evidence of a crime.156 Indeed, he argues 
that the free speech claims were even more dubious than other constitutional 
claims plaintiffs did not assert—including arguments that the regulations 
violated the Free Exercise Clause or the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination (he does not expound on the merits of these claims).157 
Schauer contends that the plaintiffs’ invocation of the Free Speech Clause 
was facilitated by the fact that the act of telling is of necessity an act of speech 
in the literal sense.158 Primarily owing to this wholly fortuitous circumstance, 
he argues, litigants strategically turned to the Free Speech Clause as a 
constitutional substitute for more germane, if again likely ineffectual, 
constitutional claims.159 The Free Speech Clause challenges, Schauer 
concludes, were a “second-best fallback position” chosen to “give sympathetic 
judges a doctrinal handle and possibly to persuade members of the public as 
well as the judiciary of the rightness of the claim.”160 Schauer concludes: “What 
had previously been a doctrinally dubious (even if morally powerful) liberty or 
equality argument had thus been transformed into a slightly less doctrinally 
dubious free-speech argument.”161 
That is perhaps the worst face one can put on the DADT free speech cases. 
Indeed, as Schauer acknowledges, other scholars have argued that the free 
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speech claims were “more than slightly plausible.”162 One of the more 
compelling free speech analyses of these claims was co-authored by Professor 
William Eskridge and his colleague at the time, Professor David Cole.163 
Eskridge and Cole argued that the government had clearly imposed a penalty on 
gay service members based solely upon their communications (“I am gay”) and 
expressive acts (including public displays of affection and private sexual 
conduct), and had thus discriminated against speech based on its content.164 
Under this regime, gay and lesbian soldiers were essentially forced to pretend 
that they were heterosexual.165 Under the military regulations, they were 
prohibited from discussing their own sexual orientation or the subject of gay and 
lesbian rights while at work, in the barracks, or even at home.166 
Eskridge, Cole, and other scholars argue persuasively that gay identity 
speech and expressive activities belong within the First Amendment’s broad 
tradition of protection for sexual expression and political dissent.167 They also 
argue that protection for gay identity speech is consistent with traditional First 
Amendment expressive values, that the regulatory justifications invoked by the 
government were content-based and failed to meet the appropriate level of 
scrutiny, and that by facilitating expressive chill and heckler’s vetoes in military 
barracks (and elsewhere) the courts were undermining sexual peace and 
contributing to sexual neuroses.168 According to these scholars, the fact that the 
government was using gay and lesbian self-identity as the sole evidence of 
criminal activity was part of the vice of the content-based regulatory scheme, 
not a justification for an exemption under evidentiary precedents.169 
My point is not to fully adjudicate the merits of these constitutional claims, 
but rather to emphasize the need for a fair and balanced review of the relative 
strength of claims that were available to the litigants and, in particular, the 
plausibility of their Free Speech Clause claims. Viewed in light of the governing 
doctrines under the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, Free Exercise 
Clause, and Fifth Amendment, it is not clear that these arguments were, as 
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Professor Schauer contends, “no different from the free-speech argument.”170 
Indeed, on close inspection, some of them appear to be quite a bit more dubious. 
Thus, instead of choosing free speech arguments owing to their “cultural 
salience” or “cultural persuasiveness,” litigants could have determined that the 
Free Speech Clause offered a stronger argument on the merits.171 Moreover, and 
importantly, rather than being wholly uninterested in free speech principles and 
values, DADT litigants were seeking to enforce them. 
In assessing the propriety of litigants’ resort to the Free Speech Clause in 
the DADT cases, we ought also to consider the political and cultural 
environment in which these claims arose. As Professor Eskridge has 
demonstrated, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell was an aspect of a broad governmental 
effort to impose an “apartheid of the closet” in part through restrictions on gay 
and lesbian communications.172 This regime focused on a form of silencing and 
censorship that sought to render LGBT persons legally and politically 
invisible.173 LGBT plaintiffs frequently invoked the Free Speech Clause to 
challenge such restrictions.174 As civil rights era plaintiffs had done, they used 
the Free Speech Clause to facilitate their quest for constitutional equality.175 The 
object, in part, was to allow LGBT persons to speak the truth about their sexual 
identities—which was at the time, and even to some degree today, a form of 
political dissent.176 
To be clear, I do not claim that there is no such thing as an “opportunistic” 
free speech claim, at least as commentators have defined or described that term. 
My more limited point is that if we are going to use the label, we need to engage 
in a holistic and neutral examination of the constitutional claims at issue. 
B. Resisting the Activist State 
As discussed earlier, commentators have suggested several causes for the 
rise in free speech opportunism.177 Two possible causes that have been largely 
overlooked are the activism of the state and the relative paucity of federal 
constitutional provisions that limit its powers. 
Behind every purportedly “opportunistic” free speech claim is a 
governmental action that gave rise to it. Civil rights activists filed Free Speech 
Clause challenges to invocations of public order, trespass, and business laws 
that were being used to exclude them or chill their activities.178 As discussed, 
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these claims were part of a systematic constitutional assault on an oppressive 
racial apartheid.179 Later, when state and local governments purported to 
exercise similar authority with regard to where and when LGBT persons could 
gather together, hold hands, cross-dress, and otherwise communicate their 
sexual orientation, litigants once again turned to the Free Speech Clause to resist 
these exercises of purported state police powers. 
In the civil rights context, authorities sought to use their regulatory power 
over public order, access to public spaces, and exercise of rights to enforce 
systems of racial and sexual apartheid. Playing on people’s fears of violence, 
disorder, and dissent, they relied on traditionally broad police powers to 
facilitate an official agenda designed to make certain persons invisible—to the 
law as well as to other citizens.180 States and other governmental authorities 
invoked these powers, and the judicial deference that traditionally applied to 
them, without regard to constitutional principles of dignity, equality, freedom 
of expression, or other fundamental rights.181 The Free Speech Clause was 
frequently used as a means of obtaining at least partial relief from these insidious 
forms of state activism and governmental opportunism.182 
More recently, states have again turned to their police powers to do some 
novel and unusual things: to restrict conversations between licensed physicians 
and their patients concerning firearms; prohibit specified forms of psychological 
talk therapy; mandate ideological disclosures to women seeking abortions; 
arrest drivers for flashing their headlights in an attempt to warn others of a speed 
trap; ban loud noises from public sports arenas; and punish creators of maps and 
charts for publishing inaccurate information.183 Further, with regard to the 
Article’s principal example, public restrooms have not always been sex-
segregated.184 Only recently have public authorities deigned to police public 
restroom use for gender compliance.185 
In each of these instances, one may seriously question whether it really is 
“fortuitous,” as critics of free speech entrepreneurism argue, that some form of 
speech or communication is involved. Indeed, the state’s dislike or disapproval 
of what is being communicated by these actions seems in many cases to be the 
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reason for its invocation of regulatory power. State legislatures might think that 
allowing physicians to discuss firearms safety with patients will convince some 
of them not to keep firearms in the home—a bad outcome for a “pro-Second 
Amendment” state.186 Some legislatures may wish to communicate ideological 
opposition to abortion rights through mandatory physician disclosures.187 
Others might object to “reparative” talk therapies on the ground that they 
communicate antiquated notions of sexual orientation as sexual dysfunction. 
Similarly, lawmakers may object that the boy who identifies as a girl, and thus 
wants to use the girls’ restroom, is conveying something “unnatural” or even 
dangerous to schoolchildren or other audiences. 
Thus, in addition to the list of factors commentators have identified as 
giving rise to what they contend are ever more frequent invocations of the Free 
Speech Clause, in areas ranging from sexual morality to regulation of business 
practices, we should add the fact of state activism and official opportunism. 
Governmental powers are being used, sometimes in novel or innovative ways, 
to regulate matters in countless areas of public and private life. The means being 
invoked are often aimed directly at the communicative nature of the regulated 
activity. 
Against these forms of state activism, constitutional litigants have a rather 
limited menu of federal constitutional protections to choose from (state menus 
are generally far more extensive). For most, this menu consists primarily of the 
enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause, and a smattering of narrowly 
defined, un-enumerated “privacy” rights. Many of these constitutional rights are 
“procedural” in nature, in the sense that they define and constrain the process 
by which governments can arrest, try, or punish individuals. What remains, in 
terms of substantive rights that limit the exercise of governmental power, is 
quite limited. Some of the substantive limits, such as the Free Exercise Clause 
and Equal Protection Clause, have undergone doctrinal limitations that have 
further blunted their scope and impact.188 Others, like the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, are useful but only in 
relatively narrow contexts. 
In light of the limited menu of rights provisions, and the non-fortuitous fact 
that many state actions are indeed responsive to communications to which the 
state objects or are designed to communicate a favored state message, we ought 
not to be surprised that litigants look to the Free Speech Clause for relief. Rather 
than assume that constitutional litigants are freely picking and choosing their 
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constitutional weapons, we ought to consider the possibility that the 
combination of state activism and limited substantive rights protections may be 
significantly influencing the nature of these choices. 
C. The Benefits of Free Speech Entrepreneurism 
As discussed earlier, commentators have considered the costs that might 
be associated with serial strategic invocations of the Free Speech Clause.189 
Some have predicted that misuse or overuse of the Free Speech Clause will 
damage its core protections for political speech, warp cultural understandings 
of the Free Speech Clause, and negatively affect certain free speech 
doctrines.190 Others have predicted far worse, up to and including the demise 
of self-government.191 
We shall have to see which, if any, of these predicted harms will actually 
materialize. Purportedly opportunistic free speech claims, some of which have 
been actively pursued for decades, do not appear to have led to dire 
consequences. In the meantime, we should not overlook the possibility that 
strategic, enterprising, or entrepreneurial invocations of the Free Speech Clause 
can lead to certain benefits—for both freedom of speech and nonspeech 
constitutional rights. 
As the civil rights example demonstrates, litigating free speech and other 
First Amendment rights raises the profile of constitutional causes that might 
otherwise not get much “air time” in American public discourse. The LGBT 
experience shows that in free speech litigation, even short-term losses can result 
in long-term benefits.192 In the short term, losing the DADT and other cases was 
a blow to the LGBT equality movement. However, in the long term, the 
movement, like predecessor movements, benefitted significantly from its 
association with the Free Speech Clause and free speech arguments.193 
When American society associates activists not with demands for “special” 
rights or accommodations, but rather with basic free speech rights, their causes 
become more mainstream. Free speech litigation, much of it admittedly novel 
and strategic, has assisted groups from the Jehovah’s Witnesses, to race equality 
activists, to LGBT advocates in reaching both public and judicial audiences.194 
Entrepreneurial free speech litigation has propelled and expanded free exercise, 
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equal protection, and other nonspeech constitutional rights.195 Among other 
things, it has created opportunities for actually exercising free speech and other 
First Amendment rights in ways that facilitate the recognition of nonspeech 
rights. 
This sort of dynamic propulsion can take decades, as litigants press free 
speech arguments inside and beyond courtrooms. Consider, for example, the 
process by which the expressive nature of self-identification—including the 
right to be present and accounted for—has been recognized. At first, only a 
few Supreme Court justices saw merit in using the Free Speech Clause to 
adjudicate such claims in the lunch counter sit-in cases.196 A few Terms later, 
the Court invalidated the breach of peace convictions of five African-
Americans who did nothing more than remain, peacefully and quietly, in a 
segregated public library reading room after they had been asked to leave.197 
The free speech claim prevailed owing, in part, to the Court’s recognition that 
the activists’ presence was itself an expressive act of resistance to racial 
apartheid.198 
Similarly, consider the notion that a person’s sexual orientation is itself 
expressive—indeed, that in some contexts, it constitutes a form of political 
dissent. As Professor Nan Hunter has observed, free speech challenges brought 
during the 1980s and 1990s by gay and lesbian employees and service members 
“complicated the expression-equality dynamic.”199 During this era, judges 
simply did not recognize the communicative nature of gay and lesbian self-
outing or its relation to equal protection rights.200 At the time, most courts were 
not willing to extend free speech coverage and protection to certain forms of 
sexual dissent.201 Only as a result of many factors—including social and 
political changes brought about, in part, by the LGBT community’s free speech 
litigation campaign—did courts finally recognize that sexual identity was a form 
of political expression.202 Transgender free speech litigation could lead to the 
similar understanding that a person’s gender is more than a biologically 
verifiable fact—a notation on one’s birth certificate. As transgender speech 
claims are adjudicated, the relationship between expression and equality rights 
could develop along similar lines. 
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As these examples show, entrepreneurial free speech litigation and 
adjudication helps to inform the scope and substance of equal protection and 
other nonspeech rights. In other words, invocation of the Free Speech Clause is 
not always an isolated, abstract event. The clause performs critical functions as 
it intersects with other constitutional rights. In general, it facilitates rights 
discourse and mediates, through a well-established free speech framework, 
public debates about nonspeech constitutional rights. The Free Speech Clause 
also generally protects the right to communicate about or concerning the 
recognition, scope, and exercise of constitutional rights.203 In sum, invoking and 
adjudicating free speech claims has contributed to our understanding of the 
meaning of other constitutional rights. 
Commentators worry that resort to the Free Speech Clause may distort free 
speech principles and doctrines.204 But we should also acknowledge that those 
principles and doctrines are, in part, the product of entrepreneurial free speech 
litigation. When it is placed in proximity to and interacts with other rights, 
including equal protection, the Free Speech Clause is often itself an object of 
change. 
During the civil rights era, for example, Supreme Court precedents 
recognized speakers’ and groups’ rights to access certain public properties, 
established the requirement that government remain neutral with regard to the 
content of speech, recognized a right of expressive association (and a right of 
privacy in those associations), and announced that the “central meaning” of the 
Free Speech Clause is that public debate ought to be “robust, uninhibited, and 
wide open.”205 These are all central or core elements of our modern free speech 
jurisprudence. They are also all products of entrepreneurial, if not 
“opportunistic,” free speech litigation. 
The question, of course, is whether the benefits of strategic free speech 
litigation outweigh its costs. We cannot know that without having a better sense 
of the likelihood that the costs ascribed to free speech opportunism will actually 
materialize. My point is simply that we ought to at least weigh in the balance 
the potential benefits from entrepreneurial invocations of the Free Speech 
Clause. 
D. Refining the “Opportunism” Critique  
I have argued that we ought to approach application of the “opportunism” 
label with caution. Indeed, throughout the Article I have suggested alternative 
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ways of describing free speech claims—e.g., strategic, enterprising, 
entrepreneurial. Part of my discomfort with the label stems from the fact that its 
criticism seems misdirected. Another difficulty is that the label seems to distract 
from the most serious potential cost of the activity being critiqued—the 
wholesale substitution of free speech for nonspeech constitutional rights. 
The primary target of the “opportunism” critique seems to be lawyers 
and litigants, who are the ones purportedly engaged in possible misuses of 
the Free Speech Clause.206 In this sense, the critique is misdirected. As noted 
earlier, critics like Professor Schauer readily acknowledge that constitutional 
litigation is naturally “opportunistic.”207 This partly explains why it is 
difficult to condemn any particular invocation of the Free Speech Clause as 
an “abuse” or “misuse” of the clause. In addition, as I have argued, it is not 
necessarily the case that lawyers and litigants who invoke the Free Speech 
Clause do so without any regard to development and enforcement of its 
principles and values, as opposed to some external goal. Many civil rights 
litigants, including the hypothetical restroom use plaintiff, simultaneously 
pursue free speech and nonspeech values.208 Focusing on litigants also raises 
the specter that certain invocations of the Free Speech Clause are worthy of 
condemnation or criticism owing to the identity or character of the 
plaintiff—strippers, political action committees, and especially big 
corporations are all persistent targets.209 Finally, irrespective of identity, no 
plaintiff owes a constitutional or moral duty to the courts or anyone else to 
forego resort to a constitutional claim that is facially plausible and could 
provide relief. 
It seems that the “opportunism” complaint is better directed at free speech 
doctrines and theories. Because these things are so capacious and unsettled, 
litigants have many more opportunities to test and expand the boundaries and 
meanings of “the freedom of speech.”210 Taking this analytic perspective, Leslie 
Kendrick has suggested that the difficulty may lie in “the nature of speech and 
the nature of rules.”211 Opportunism and expansionism persist, she argues, in 
part because of the simplistic notion that any time words are regulated, the Free 
Speech Clause is in play, and the reluctance or inability of courts and scholars 
to settle on a rule or guiding principle to cabin the scope of the clause.212 
Of course, this dilemma is not unique to the Free Speech Clause. Criminal 
defendants frequently argue for broader definitions of “search” or “seizure” 
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under the Fourth Amendment.213 Second Amendment litigants are presently 
arguing for expansive definitions of what constitutes “arms” and what it means 
to “keep” and “bear” them.214 For a few reasons, we may worry more about 
coverage in the free speech context. First, with regard to the Free Speech Clause, 
we generally lack some of the source materials that are used to constrain or 
narrow the language of other provisions. For example, original understandings 
of the Free Speech Clause are less readily available and thus of less use in the 
free speech context.215 Further, and perhaps more importantly, the ubiquity of 
communicative activity (words) combined with the capacious language of the 
Free Speech Clause could imperil the pursuit of broad regulatory interests 
relating to public health, welfare, and safety. 
One answer to these concerns is that we entrust judges with the power and 
discretion to interpret coverage in a way that protects freedom of speech without 
imperiling the regulatory state. If accurate, reports of the success of free speech 
“opportunism” are worrisome indeed. But even if there has been a rise in the 
invocation of the Free Speech Clause across different areas of law, we really do 
not know, empirically speaking, at what rate or to what degree “opportunistic” 
free speech claims are actually succeeding. True, as Professor Kendrick and 
others have observed, courts have recognized certain commercial free speech 
claims that seem to stretch the Free Speech Clause’s coverage and protection.216 
However, courts have also rejected many other enterprising free speech claims. 
For example, courts have held that the following are not covered and/or 
protected speech in certain contexts: “reparative” talk therapy; physician–
patient consultations concerning the possession of firearms; mandatory abortion 
disclosures; public nudity; and taking photographs or baking cakes for same-sex 
wedding celebrations.217 I have argued that there is nothing inherently wrong in 
pursuing such claims and may disagree with some of these holdings. Regardless, 
they all represent counter-examples of the purported trend. 
If history is any guide, civil rights and other litigants will continue to press 
the boundaries of the Free Speech Clause. Courts will continue to face 
challenges in drawing those boundaries in a manner that preserves free speech 
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rights while permitting governments to exercise their police and other powers. 
How things proceed might turn, as Professor Kendrick suggests, on whether 
courts and scholars can successfully confront the textual and theoretical 
challenges posed by the Free Speech Clause.218 
My final point concerning the opportunism/expansionism critique relates to 
the relative costs of these two related phenomena. As between the two, 
expansionism poses the greater danger. More precisely, a certain kind of 
expansionism poses a significant threat to the system of constitutional rights. 
Recall that expansionism consists of the colonizing of areas of law or 
constitutional text.219 It is one thing to use the Free Speech Clause to 
facilitate nonspeech rights like equal protection. It is quite another to invoke 
and adjudicate free speech claims in a manner that results in its supplanting 
or subordinating various nonspeech constitutional rights. As scholars have 
observed, the Free Speech Clause has already effectively supplanted 
neighboring provisions including the Press Clause, the Assembly Clause, 
and the Petition Clause.220 In a related phenomenon, litigants and courts have 
invoked and adjudicated free speech claims in ways that have partially 
supplanted the Free Exercise Clause.221 In short, the Free Speech Clause has 
exhibited a tendency to supplant or subordinate certain constitutional 
provisions. Those provisions then become “ancillary” to the Free Speech 
Clause, or part of a generalized and nontextual “Free Expression Clause.” 
We ought to be particularly wary of this particular kind of expansionism. 
One reason for concern is that it effectively reduces the already limited number 
of independent limits on governmental action. Textual expansionism 
undermines the Constitution’s pluralistic system of individual rights, which 
extends constitutional protection outside and beyond the domain of “expressive” 
activity. The primary danger, then, is not that some “opportunistic” free speech 
claims will be successful, but that over time invocation and adjudication of those 
claims will supplant other constitutional rights. As I have noted, that did not 
occur during the civil rights campaigns. Whether it will occur in other areas, or 
result from other claims, remains to be seen. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Critics of free speech “opportunism” decry certain invocations of the Free 
Speech Clause. Litigants, particularly but not exclusively commercial ones, who 
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reframe what seem to be nonspeech constitutional claims as free speech claims 
are being criticized for doing so. Critics argue that using the Free Speech Clause 
as a “second-best” basis for relief may harm the clause’s core values, diminish 
existing doctrinal protections, and lead to its unwarranted expansion. 
This Article seeks to shift the focus of the debate somewhat. It uses the 
example of a free speech challenge to public restroom use laws that restrict 
access based on birth gender. Determining whether such a claim is 
“opportunistic” is not as simple as it may seem. After careful consideration of 
the relative merit of all available alternative claims, the historical and cultural 
context, and the tradition of civil rights free speech litigation, I conclude that it 
would not be fair or proper to characterize such claims as “opportunistic.” That 
does not mean I think it preferable to frame the restroom use claim in free 
speech terms; only that it ought not to be deemed a “misuse” of the Free Speech 
Clause. 
The example highlights some of the difficulties with the “opportunism” 
label, which I take to have pejorative meaning. Not least among these is the fact 
that there is no agreed-upon consensus for what constitutes a proper use, as 
opposed to a misuse, of the Free Speech Clause. As well, and as critics readily 
concede, we expect constitutional litigants to use any and all available 
constitutional claims necessary in order to obtain relief. As the civil rights 
experience shows, free speech claims that may appear on their surface to be 
“opportunistic” might be better characterized, after careful consideration, as 
“enterprising” or “entrepreneurial.” These claims are sometimes reactions to 
activist and opportunistic states, which are using their broad police powers in 
novel and intrusive ways. Finally, as the civil rights example also demonstrates, 
free speech resistance can produce benefits both for the freedom of speech and 
for nonspeech rights like equal protection and due process. 
In short, the “opportunism” label carries a normative judgment that is 
sometimes, if not often, difficult to defend. That is not to say that critics’ 
complaints have no merit, or that there might not be genuine “misuses” of the 
Free Speech Clause. In that regard, the genuine target of the opportunism 
critique seems not to be particular litigants or claims, but rather the capacious 
language of the Free Speech Clause and the inability of courts and scholars to 
produce a coherent theory or rule to cabin it. Until that occurs, we ought to 
expect free speech entrepreneurs to enter the void and test the boundaries of the 
Free Speech Clause. We ought also to expect that they will use the clause as a 
means of facilitating, advancing, or perhaps resurrecting nonspeech 
constitutional rights. These are not misuses, but rather traditional functions, of 
the Free Speech Clause. 
As this enterprising litigation occurs, there is one danger or threat that we 
ought to watch for and guard against. The Free Speech Clause should not 
subordinate or supplant other constitutional rights. In other words, as between 
what critics call free speech “opportunism” and what has been referred to as free 
speech “expansionism,” the latter poses the greater threat to constitutional 
liberty. Whatever short-term benefits may accrue to litigants or movements from 
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invoking the Free Speech Clause in novel or distinctive ways, in the long run a 
“Free Expression Clause” is not an adequate substitute for the Constitution’s 
collection of individual rights. 
  

